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Mr. Geoffrey Butler 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Busch Corporation vs. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Company, et al., Case No. 19859 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the case of Weaver Brothers, Inc. v. Chappel, 
684 P.2nd 123 (Alaska 1984), a copy of which is attached, 
is hereby submitted as supplemental authority in support 
of Point II of the plaintiff/appellantfs Brief, regarding 
the effect of breach of notice provisions in relieving 
an insurer of its obligations under the insurance polcy. 
The reason for bringing this case to the attention 
of the Court at this time is that it is a recently decided, 
newly published opinion which is directly on point with 
the issue, as stated above, which has not previously been 
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Very truly yours, 




cc: Darwin C. Hansen, Esq. 
Roger H. Bullock, Esq, 
FILED 
FEBl 11985 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
WEAVER BROS., 
Cite as 684 P.2d 
We affirm the remand to the CFEC to 
allow Byayuk to present evidence on his 
claim for income dependence points under 
Temple ton. The portion of the order al-
lowing Byayuk to submit evidence on his 
failure to meet the additional evidence 
deadline is vacated. 
AFFIRMED as modified.26 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
^ 
WEAVER BROTHERS, INC., Appellant. 
v. 
Patricia CHAPPEL, Special Administra-
tor of the Estate of Eberhardt 
Hantsch, Appellee. 
No. 7603. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
June 29, 1984. 
Wrongful death action was filed, in 
which claim for contribution was filed. 
The special administrator moved for sum-
mary judgment. The Superior Court, Third 
Judicial District, Milton M. Souter, J., 
granted motion, and appeal was taken. 
The Supreme Court, Compton, J., held that: 
(1) absent prejudice, delayed notice is no 
reason for excusing an insurer from its 
obligations; (2) insurer must prove preju-
dice from untimely notice; and (3) since 
insurer failed to show want of genuine 
issues of fact, summary judgment should 
have been denied regardless of whether 
opponent failed to respond. 
Reversed and remanded. 
INC. v. CHAPPEL Alaska 123 
123 (Alaska 1984) 
tual principles, and insurance policies may 
be considered contracts of adhesion due to 
inequality in bargaining power. 
2. Insurance <S=>539.8 
Requirement of prompt notice of claim 
or loss is to protect the insurer from preju-
dice and absent prejudice, regardless of 
reasons for the delayed notice, there is no 
justification for excusing the insurer from 
its obligations. 
3. Insurance <s=>539.8 
In case of untimely notice to an insur-
er, the insurer must prove that it has actu-
ally been prejudiced by the delay before its 
liability is extinguished; declining to follow 
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 360 
F.Supp. 139; Artukovich v. St.Paul-Mer-
cury Indemnity Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 312, 
310 P.2d 461; Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Casu-
alty Co., 222 So.2d 206; Calhoun v. West-
ern Casualty & Surety Co., 260 Wis. 34, 
49 N.W.2d 911. 
4. Insurance <$=562.4(1) 
Generally, proof of prejudice to an in-
surer from delayed notice is a fact ques-
tion. 
5. Judgment <S=181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment may only be grant-
ed if the proponent shows that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that he 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
6. Judgment <3=>185.3(12) 
Since insurer did not meet its initial 
burden of showing that there were no gen-
uine issues of material fact, summary judg-
ment motion should have been denied re-
gardless of whether opponent failed to re-
spond to the motion with affidavits or other 
evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e). 
1. Insurance <s=>146 
Interpretation of insurance provisions 
is not controlled directly by usual contrac-
26. The other issues raised by the parties are 
only relevant if we decline to apply Templeton 
retroactively to final determinations. Since we 
Mark A. Sandberg, Camerot, Sandberg & 
Hunter, Anchorage, for appellant. 
Nelson P. Cohen, Anchorage, for appel-
lee. 
do extend Templeton to that level, we need not 
address the other issues. 
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Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOW-




This case raises the issue of whether 
untimely notice of an accident to an insurer 
is per se sufficient to relieve the insurer 
from any obligation to the insured. If not, 
we must decide who has the burden of 
demonstrating that the delay prejudiced 
the insurer and whether the burden has 
been met in this case. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND. 
Eberhardt Hantsch, Mama Jill Hantsch 
and Jonathan Hantsch were killed on Sep-
tember 4, 1974, when their Volkswagon 
van, driven by Eberhardt, collided with a 
tractor-trailer driven by Thomas Todd, an 
employee of Weaver Brothers, Inc. (hereaf-
ter WBI). Eberhardt Hantsch was insured 
by the Insurance Company of British Co-
lumbia (hereafter ICBC). 
Sometime after the accident a settlement 
of $85,000 was negotiated between the 
heirs of Eberhardt Hantsch and WBI, Todd 
and Insurance Company of North America 
(hereafter INA), one of WBFs insurance 
companies. A personal representative was 
appointed for Eberhardt's estate to accept 
the wrongful death settlement. The supe-
rior court ordered payment to the estate on 
November 4, 1975. The heirs of Eber-
hardt's estate subsequently released WBI, 
Todd, and INA from any and all claims 
arising from the September 4, 1974, acci-
dent. However, WBI, Todd and INA did 
not release the estate from liability. The 
estate was closed in 1979. 
On October 20, 1975, a wrongful death 
action was filed against WBI on behalf of 
the estates of Marna Jill Hantsch and Jona-
than Hantsch. WBI filed an answer in 
November 1975 in which it asserted, inter 
alia, that the negligence of Eberhardt 
caused the accident. Later, in 1978, WBI 
moved to amend the answer to assert a 
third-party claim sounding in contribution 
against the estate of Eberhardt. This mo-
tion was denied. The case went to trial in 
1979 and a jury verdict was returned for 
the estates of Marna Jill and Jonathan. 
WBI appealed the verdict, but settled the 
matter for $575,000 while the appeal was 
pending. 
WBI filed a claim for contribution 
against the estate of Eberhardt Hantsch on 
October 27, 1980. Patricia Chappel was 
appointed as special administrator for the 
estate on November 5. A complaint for 
contribution already had been filed against 
her on October 10, prior to her appoint-
ment. 
Chappel notified ICBC of the contribu-
tion action on November 11, 1980. This 
was the first notice to ICBC of the automo-
bile accident of September 4, 1974. On 
November 28, 1982, Chappel moved for a 
summary judgment stating that "the only 
source for relief herein is from an insur-
ance policy which does not provide cover-
age." There was no policy coverage since 
the notice was untimely and the delay was 
unreasonable, unjustifiable and prejudicial. 
The superior court granted the summary 
judgment on February 23, 1983, and this 
appeal followed. 
There are three questions before us in 
this appeal: 1) Does untimely notice per se 
relieve the insurer from any obligation un-
der the insurance policy? 2) If not, who 
has the burden of demonstrating prejudice 
to the insurer as a result of the delay? 3) 
Has sufficient prejudice been demonstrated 
in this case so that summary judgment was 
proper? 
II. EFFECT OF UNTIMELY NOTICE 
ICBC was first notified of the automobile 
accident over six years after the date of the 
accident. Eberhardt Hantsch's insurance 
policy provided the following as to notice: 
6.24 Each insured shall promptly give 
to the corporation written notice, with all 
available particulars, of any accident in-
volving loss or damage to persons or 
property in which he, or any motor-vehi-
WEAVER BROS., INC. v. CHAPPEL 
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cle owned or driven by him, has been 
involved, and of any claim made on ac-
count of any such accident; . . . 
The policy also stated that a breach of any 
condition entitles the insurance company to 
refuse to pay any indemnity. There is no 
question as to the lateness of the notice in 
this case but we must decide whether the 
delay per se relieves the insurance compa-
ny from payment under the policy. 
[1] We note first that interpretation of 
insurance provisions is not controlled di-
rectly by usual contractual principles. In-
surance policies may be considered con-
tracts of adhesion due to the inequality in 
bargaining power. In Stordahl v. Govern-
ment Employees Insurance Co., 564 P.2d 
63, 66 (Alaska 1977), we stated that an 
insurance provision "should be construed 
to provide the coverage which a layperson 
would have reasonably expected, given a 
lay interpretation of the policy language." 
(Footnote omitted). See also Guin v. Ha, 
591 P.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Alaska 1979). 
Traditionally, courts have construed 
prompt notice provisions as conditions 
precedent to liability under an insurance 
policy. 2 R.H. Long, Law of Liability In-
surance, § 13.03 (1982). The insurer is not 
liable until the notice requirement is met. 
If prompt notice is not given then liability 
under the policy has not matured. This 
strict contractual approach has often been 
tempered by allowing exceptions where the 
insured's delay is excused. Sanderson v. 
Postal Life Insurance Co., 87 F.2d 58 
(10th Cir.1936) (16-year delay excused due 
to party's ignorance as to existence of cov-
erage); Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Wells, 453 F.Supp. 808 (N.D.Ala.1978) 
(lVz-year delay excused when plaintiff did 
not know that father's automobile insur-
ance covered son's motorcycle accident); 
Suire v. Combined Insurance Co. of 
America, 290 So.2d 271 (La. 1974); Thomp-
1. See Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 
371 A.2d 193, 198 n. 8 (1977). 
2. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 360 F.Supp. 
139, 141 (D.Colo. 1973); Artukovich v. St. Paul-
Mercury Indemnity Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 312, 310 
son v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
447 Pa. 271, 290 A.2d 422 (1972). 
[2] The modern trend rejects the above 
approach and considers prejudice to the 
insurer as the material factor. Brakeman 
v. Potomac Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 
A.2d 193 (1977); Pulse v. Northwest Farm 
Bureau Insurance Co., 18 Wash.App. 59, 
566 P.2d 577 (1977). This trend is consist-
ent with the purpose behind prompt notice 
provisions. The purpose has been well 
summarized in 8 J. Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice § 4731, at 2-5 (Rev. ed. 
1981): 
The purpose of a policy provision requir-
ing the insured to give the company 
prompt notice of an accident or claim is 
to give the insurer an opportunity to 
make a timely and adequate investiga-
tion of all the circumstances And 
further, if the insurer is thus given the 
opportunity for a timely investigation, 
reasonable compromises and settlements 
may be made, thereby avoiding pro-
longed and unnecessary litigation. 
[Footnote omitted]. 
In short, the notice requirement is designed 
to protect the insurer from prejudice. In 
the absence of prejudice, regardless of the 
reasons for the delayed notice, there is no 
justification for excusing the insurer from 
its obligations under the policy. We recog-
nize the strong societal interest in preserv-
ing insurance coverage for accident victims 
so long as the preservation is equitable for 
all parties involved.1 
III. BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING 
PREJUDICE 
[3] Jurisdictions which have treated 
prejudice as the material factor still disa-
gree as to who has the burden of proving 
existence or lack of prejudice. Some juris-
dictions require the insured to prove that 
the untimely notice did not prejudice the 
company2 while others place the burden of 
P.2d 461, 469 (1957) (untimely notice raises 
presumption of prejudice and insured has bur-
den of rebutting); Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Casualty 
Co., 222 So.2d 206, 209 (Fla.1969); Calhoun v. 
Western Casualty & Surety Co., 260 Wis. 34, 49 
N.W.2d 911, 912 (1951). 
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demonstrating prejudice on the insurer.3 
We conclude the burden should be on the 
insurer. Information regarding prejudice 
is generally more readily available to the 
insurer than the insured. The insurer is in 
a better position to demonstrate that its 
ability to investigate, defend or settle a 
claim has been impaired. 
We hold that in a case of untimely notice 
to an insurer, the insurer must prove that 
it has actually been prejudiced by the delay 
before its liability is extinguished. 
IV. PREJUDICE TO ICBC 
[4,5] Generally proof of prejudice to 
the insurer is a question of fact. Pulse v. 
Northwest Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 
18 Wash.App. 59, 566 P 2d 577, 579 (1977). 
A summary judgment may only be granted 
if the proponent of the motion shows that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and also that he is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Wickwire v. McFadden, 
576 P.2d 986, 987 (Alaska 1978); Whaley v. 
State, 438 P.2d 718, 719 (Alaska 1968). 
The estate and ICBC argue that the sum-
mary judgment motion was properly grant-
ed since they proffered undisputed evi-
dence of prejudice. Since WBI did not 
respond to the allegations of prejudice, 
ICBC claims that Alaska Civil Rule 56(e) 
supports the granting of the motion.4 
ICBC claims that it was prejudiced in 
three ways: 1) opportunities to investigate 
have been lost; 2) opportunities to negoti-
ate and settle have been lost; and 3) oppor-
3. LaPlace v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd, 298 FSupp 
764, 767 (DV.I.1969), Lindus v. Northern Ins. 
Co, 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P 2d 311, 315 (1968), 
Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d at 198, 
Pulse v. Northwest Farm Bureau Ins Co., 18 
Wash.App. 59, 566 P 2d 577, 579 (1977). 
4. Alaska Civil Rule 56(e) reads in part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provid-
ed in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
tunities to defend have been lost. Had 
ICBC met its initial burden of showing that 
there was no genuine issue of material 
fact, WBFs failure to respond with affida-
vits or other evidence would justify the 
summary judgment. However, ICBC did 
no more than to allege prejudice. It intro-
duced no evidence in support of its claims.5 
For instance there was no evidence that 
ICBC customarily investigated or settled 
similar claims.6 This case is very similar to 
that before the Washington court in Ore-
gon Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Salzberg, 85 Wash.2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 
(1975). There, the court concluded that the 
summary judgment should not have been 
granted, since the "respondent alleged that 
it incurred prejudice by Salzberg's actions, 
but there is nothing in the record support-
ive of this contention." Id. at 819.7 
[6] Since ICBC did not meet its initial 
burden of showing that there were no gen-
uine issues of material fact the summary 
judgment motion should have been denied 
regardless of whether WBI failed to re-
spond to the motion with affidavits or other 
evidence. See Jacobsen v. State, 89 
Wash.2d 104, 569 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1977). 
The judgment is REVERSED and RE-
MANDED. 
5. See Ratchff v. Security Natl Bank, 670 P 2d 
1139, 1142 (Alaska 1983) (To discharge burden 
of showing no material issues of fact, movant 
must submit admissible evidence in support of 
its version of the facts). 
6. Indeed, ICBC's examiner—a person respon-
sible for any claims of excess of $25,000 origi-
nating out of the Province of British Colum-
bia—was instructed by ICBC counsel not to an-
swer any questions regarding handling claims 
arising in the United States. 
7. WBI also sought to obtain from ICBC the 
outside date ICBC would have considered notice 
in compliance with the policy. ICBC declined 
to respond on the ground that it was not a party 
to the lawsuit. 
